Ashish Goel, Reyna Hulett and Benjamin Plaut.
Markets Beyond Nash Welfare for Leontief Utilities
Nicole Immorlica, Benjamin Plaut and E. Glen Weyl.
Equality of Power and Fair Public Decision-making
Moshe Babaioff and Uriel Feige.
A New Approach to Fair Distribution of Welfare
Thomas Kesselheim, Alexandros Psomas and Shai Vardi.
How to Hire Secretaries with Stochastic Departures
Eirini Georgoulaki and Kostas Kollias.
On the Price of Anarchy of Cost-Sharing in Real-Time Scheduling Systems
Yuqing Kong, Christopher Peikert, Grant Schoenebeck and Biaoshuai Tao.
Outsourcing Computation: the Minimal Refereed Mechanism
Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton Lee and David Parkes.
The Capacity Constrained Facility Location Problem
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Philip Lazos.
The Pareto Frontier of Inefficiency in Mechanism Design
Yaonan Jin, Weian Li and Qi Qi.
On the Approximability of Simple Mechanisms for MHR Distributions
Carme Àlvarez Faura and Arnau Messegué.
On the Price of Anarchy for High-Edge Price
Tobias Harks and Anja Schedel.
Capacity and Price Competition in Markets with Congestion Effects
Zhenzhe Zheng and R. Srikant.
Optimal Search Segmentation Mechanisms for Online Platform Markets
Ben Abramowitz, Elliot Anshelevich and Wennan Zhu.
Awareness of Voter Passion Greatly Improves the Distortion of Metric Social Choice
Michael Curry, John Dickerson, Karthik Abinav Sankararaman, Aravind Srinivasan, Yuhao Wan and Pan Xu.
Mix and Match: Markov Chains & Mixing Times for Matching in Rideshare
Pieter Kleer and Guido Schaefer.
Topological Price of Anarchy Bounds for Clustering Games on Networks
Jerry Anunrojwong, Yiling Chen, Bo Waggoner and Haifeng Xu.
Computing Equilibria of Prediction Markets via Persuasion
Roberto Cominetti, Valerio Dose and Marco Scarsini.
The Price of Anarchy in Routing Games as a Function of the Demand
Saeed Alaei, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Mohammad Mahdian and Sadra Yazdanbod.
Response Prediction for Low-Regret Agents
Itai Ashlagi and Süleyman Kerimov.
Scrip Systems with Minimal Availability
Marc Schroder, Tami Tamir and Vipin Ravindran Vijayalakshmi.
Scheduling Games with Machine-Dependent Priority Lists
Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer and David Lingenbrink.
Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach
Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna and Carmine Ventre.
Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set Systems: The Case of Small Domains
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili and Oriol Tejada.
Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: A Devil’s Menu
Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Siddharth Barman, Rachitesh Kumar and Nidhi Rathi.
Fair and Efficient Cake Division with Connected Pieces
Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas and S. Matthew Weinberg.
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality
Avi Cohen and David Peleg.
Hotelling Games with Random Tolerance Intervals
Almost quasi-linear utilities in disguise: An extension of Roberts' theorem
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru and Aranyak Mehta.
Autobidding with Constraints
Amirmahdi Ahmadinejad, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi, Nolan Skochdopole and Kane Sweeney.
Competition in Ride-Hailing Markets
Adam Elmachtoub, Vishal Gupta and Michael Hamilton.
The Value of Personalized Pricing
Evangelos Markakis and Artem Tsikiridis.
On Core-selecting and Core-competitive Mechanisms for Binary Single-Parameter Auctions
Pu Yang, Krishnamurthy Iyer and Peter Frazier.
Information Design in Spatial Resource Competition
Hagen Echzell, Tobias Friedrich, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, Marcus Pappik, Friedrich Schöne, Fabian Sommer and David Stangl.
Convergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling Segregation
Felix Brandt and Anaëlle Wilczynski.
On the Convergence of Swap Dynamics to Pareto-Optimal Matchings
Victor Boone and Georgios Piliouras.
From Darwin to Poincar\'e and von Neumann: Recurrence and Cycles in Evolutionary and Algorithmic Game Theory
The Classes PPA-k : Existence from Arguments Modulo k